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Abstract
This paper presents a technique to derive and implement 
error detectors to protect an application from data errors. 
The error detectors are derived automatically using 
compiler-based static analysis from the backward program 
slice o f critical variables in the program. Critical variables 
are defined as those that are highly sensitive to errors, and 
deriving error detectors fo r these variables provides high 
coverage for errors in any data value used in the program. 
The error detectors take the form o f  checking expressions 
and are optimized fo r  each control flow path followed at 
runtime. The derived detectors are implemented using a 
combination o f hardware and software and constantly 
monitor the application at runtime. I f  an error is detected at 
runtime, the application is stopped so as to prevent error 
propagation and enable a clean recovery. Experiments show 
that the derived detectors achieve low-overhead error 
detection while providing high coverage for errors that 
matter to the application.
1. Introduction
This paper presents a methodology to derive error detectors 
for an application based on compiler (static) analysis. The 
derived detectors protect the application from data errors. A 
data error is defined as a divergence in the data values used 
in the application from an error-free run of the program. 
Data errors can result from incorrect computation and would 
not be caught by generic techniques such as ECC in 
memory. They can also arise due to software defects (bugs). 
Many static analysis [1][2][3] and dynamic analysis [8] [9] 
approaches have been proposed to find bugs in programs. 
These approaches have proven effective in finding known 
kinds of errors prior to deployment of the application in an 
operational environment. However, studies have shown that 
the kinds of errors encountered by applications in 
operational settings are subtle software errors (such as 
timing and synchronization errors) [20] [26] [33], which are 
not caught by static and dynamic methods.
In order to detect runtime errors, we need mechanisms that 
can provide high-coverage, low-latency (rapid) error 
detection to: (i) preempt uncontrolled system crash/hang and 
(ii) prevent propagation of erroneous data and limit the 
extent of the (potential) damage. Eliminating error 
propagation is essential because programs, upon
encountering an error that could eventually lead to a crash, 
may execute for billions of cycles before crashing [27], 
During this time, the program can exhibit unpredictable
behavior, such as writing corrupted state to a checkpoint file 
[32],
Duplication has traditionally been used to provide high- 
coverage at runtime for software errors and hardware-errors. 
However, duplication suffers from the following 
disadvantage: in order to prevent error-propagation and
preempt crashes, a comparison needs to be performed after 
every instruction, which in turn results in high performance 
overhead. IBM G5 processors perform the comparison in 
hardware to reduce the performance overhead of duplication, 
but have high hardware design complexity. Further, 
duplication detects many benign errors [16]. Benign errors 
are errors that would not have impacted the application even 
if the error had not been detected.
The approach presented in this paper derives error detectors 
(or checks) based on static analysis but performs the 
detection at runtime. It takes into account the placement of 
checks to preempt crashes and provides high-coverage to 
detect errors that result in application failures. The approach 
is complementary to existing static analysis techniques and 
detects subtle errors such as timing errors in the program. In 
addition, the derived checks can naturally detect hardware 
errors that occur in the processor and the memory. The main 
contribution of this paper is that it extends static analysis 
techniques to derive runtime error detectors based on 
application properties.
The coverage of the derived detectors is evaluated using 
fault-injection experiments. The key findings are as follows:
• Derived detectors detect around 75% of errors that 
propagate and cause crashes, and in many cases (80% of 
detections), detects the error before propagation.
• The derived detectors detect only 2% of the benign 
errors. In comparison, full-duplication detects 40-50% 
of benign errors [16],
• The average performance overhead of the derived 
detectors across 14 benchmark applications is 33%.
2. Related W ork
This section considers related work on locating software 
bugs using derived invariants as well as on runtime detection 
of hardware and software errors. The set of techniques 
discussed can be divided into six broad groups as follows: 
Static Analysis Techniques: There have been many 
techniques proposed to find bugs in programs based on a 
static analysis of the application code [ 1 ][2][3]. These 
techniques validate the program based on a well-understood 
fault model, usually specified based on common
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programming bugs (e.g. NULL pointer dereferences). The 
techniques attempt to locate errors across all feasible paths 
in the program (a program path that corresponds to an actual 
execution of the program). Determining feasible paths is 
known to be an impossible problem in the general case. 
Therefore, these techniques make approximations that result 
in the creation of spurious paths. This in turn can result in 
the approach finding errors that will never occur in a real 
execution, leading to wasteful detections.
Dynamic Invariant Deduction: These techniques derive 
code-specific invariants based on dynamic characteristics of 
the application. An example of this technique is DAIKON 
[8], which derives code invariants such as the constancy of a 
variable, linear relationships among sets of program 
variables and inequalities involving two or more program 
variables. DAIKON's primary purpose is to present the 
invariants found to programmers, who can validate them 
based on their mental model of the application. The 
invariants are derived based on the execution of the 
application with a representative set of inputs, called the 
training set. Inputs that are not in this set may result in the 
invariants being violated even when there is no error in the 
application.
DIDUCE [9] is a dynamic invariant detection approach 
that uses the invariants learned during an early phase of the 
program to detect errors in the subsequent execution. It is 
unclear how the invariants learned during the early stages of 
execution well represent the entire application’s execution.
Rule-based Error Detectors: Hiller et al [5] provide rule- 
based templates to the programmer for specifying runtime 
error detectors. However, the programmer needs to choose 
the right templates to be used for detection and supply the 
parameters of the template to the system. The technique 
automates the placement of the derived detectors to preempt 
application failures [6], Pattabiraman et al. [10] derive error 
detectors based on rule-based templates, wherein the choice 
of templates and the parameters to be checked are 
automatically derived. The generic problem with rule-based 
detectors however, is that they are specific to an application 
domain (e.g. specific embedded applications), and it is 
difficult to make them work for general-purpose 
applications.
Inferring specifications from code: The main idea here is 
to leam program patterns from source code analysis and 
consider violations of these patterns as program bugs [4], 
Patterns are learned from localized code samples and 
extended to the whole code base. The techniques are useful 
for finding common programming errors such as copy-and- 
paste errors [12] or an error due to the programmer 
forgetting to perform an operation [4], such as releasing 
locks. It is unclear if they can be used for detecting more 
subtle errors that occur in well-tested code, such as timing 
and memory errors, as these errors may not be easily 
localized to particular code sections [20], Further, these 
techniques have large false-positive rates i.e. many errors do 
not correspond to real bugs.
Compiler-based Replication: The entire program is 
replicated either at the source-level [13], instruction level 
[14] or at the compiler intermediate code level [15], The
results of the replicated instructions (statements) are 
compared after every instruction (statement) [13] or at 
selected program points such as stores to memory [14], [15], 
These techniques require the entire program to be replicated 
in order to provide protection, which can result in high 
performance overheads (90-100%)1. An important issue in 
all low-level replication techniques is that they result in the 
detection of many errors that have no impact on the 
application (benign errors) [27], This constitutes a wasteful 
detection (and consequent recovery) from the application’s 
viewpoint.
Further, duplication-based techniques offer limited 
protection from software faults and permanent hardware 
faults because the original program and the duplicated 
program can suffer from common mode errors. In order to 
deal with common-mode errors, diverse execution 
techniques that execute two different versions of the same 
program and compare the results must be used.
ED4I [17] is a software-based diverse execution technique 
to protect against transient and permanent hardware faults. 
The original program is transformed into a different program 
in which each data operand is multiplied by a constant value 
k. The original program and the transformed program are 
both executed on the same processor and the results are 
compared. Since the transformed program operates on a 
different set of data operands than the original program, it is 
able to mask hardware errors in processor functional units 
and memory. However, the technique cannot detect software 
errors that result in incorrect computation of data values in 
both the original program and the transformed program.
Runtime Verification: Runtime-verification techniques 
attempt to bridge the gap between formal techniques such as 
model checking and runtime checking techniques. These 
techniques check whether the program violates a 
programmer-specified safety property [18] [19] by 
constructing a model of the program and checking the model 
based on the actual program execution. The checking is done 
at specific program points depending on the model. 
However, if there is a general error in the program there is 
no guarantee that the program will reach the check before 
crashing. Since the papers describing these techniques 
[18] [19] only consider errors that are directly detectable (by 
the checking technique), it is unclear if the techniques 
provide useful runtime coverage for a random hardware or 
software error.
Runtime-error-detection techniques: The static
techniques we have discussed are geared towards detecting 
errors at compile-time, while the dynamic analysis 
techniques are geared towards providing feedback to the 
programmer. Both these types are fault-avoidance 
techniques (fault is removed before the program is 
operational).
Despite the existence of these techniques and rigorous 
program testing, subtle but important errors such as timing 
errors persist in a program [20] (as these errors cannot be
Most of these studies consider replication on RISC processors, which 
have excess capacity in terms of registers. A recent study on instruction 
replication for x86 processors reports an average overhead of 900% [29]
detected at compile-time). Runtime-error detection 
techniques are geared towards addressing these errors (and 
also hardware errors). As we have already seen, full 
replication can detect many of these errors; but not only does 
it incur significant performance overheads, it also results in a 
large number of benign error detections that have no impact 
on the application [16], Thus, there is a need for a technique 
that takes advantage of application characteristics and 
detects arbitrary errors at runtime without incurring the 
overheads of replication.
The question that we attempt to answer in this paper is: Is 
it possible to derive software-based runtime checks to 
minimize the detection latency, preempt crashes and reduce 
fail-silent violations? This is crucial in order to perform 
rapid recovery upon application failure [26].
3. Approach
This section presents an overview of the proposed detector 
derivation approach. The approach is based on the well- 
known technique of program slicing.
3.1 Terms and Definitions
Backward Program Slice of a variable at a program location 
is defined as the set of all program statements/instructions 
that can affect the value of the variable at that program 
location [21], Slicing techniques can be classified into static 
and dynamic slicing techniques [22],
Critical variable: A program variable that exhibits high 
sensitivity to random data errors in the application is a 
critical variable. Placing checks on critical variables 
achieves high detection coverage.
Checking expression: A checking expression is a sequence 
o f instructions that recomputes the critical variable, and is 
optimized aggressively and differently from the rest o f the 
program code. The instruction sequence is computed from 
the backward slice of the critical variable for a specific 
control path in the program. Checking expressions are 
referred to synonymously as checks in the paper. Checks are 
placed after the computation of the critical variable in the 
original program.
Detector: Each derived path can have its own checking 
expression. At runtime, the program is monitored and only 
the checking expression corresponding to the runtime path 
followed is asserted. A detector is defined as the 
combination o f the checking expression and the runtime 
monitoring.
3.2 Slicing Algorithm
The slicing algorithm presented in this paper is a static 
slicing technique that considers all possible dependences 
between instructions in the program regardless of program 
inputs. It does not perform inter-procedural slicing allowing 
the analysis to be scaled to large applications. This can affect 
the coverage of the derived detectors.
However, by placing multiple detectors in the program at 
critical variables, it is possible to achieve high coverage (as 
shown in our results in Section 5.2). This is because at least 
one of the detectors placed in the program will be able to 
detect the error.
3.3 Steps in Detector Derivation
The main steps in the derivation of error detectors are as 
follows:
Identification of critical variables: The critical variables 
are identified based on an analysis of the dynamic 
dependence graph of the program presented in [10], This 
analysis is carried out on a per-function basis in the program 
i.e. each function in the program is considered separately for 
identification of critical variables.
Computation of backward slice of critical variables: A
backward traversal of the static dependence graph of the 
program is performed starting from the instruction that 
computes the value of the critical variable going back to the 
beginning of the function.
The slice is specialized for each acyclic control path that 
reaches the computation of the critical variable from the top 
of the function.
Check derivation, Check insertion and instrumentation:
Check derivation: The specialized backward slice for each 
control path is optimized considering only the instructions 
on the corresponding path, to form the checking expression. 
Check insertion: The checking expression is inserted in the 
program immediately after the computation of the critical 
variable (check placement point).
Instrumentation: Program is instrumented to track control- 
paths followed at runtime so as to choose the checking 
expression for that specific path.
Runtime checking in hardw are and software:
The control path followed is tracked by the inserted 
instrumentation in hardware at runtime (path-tracking). The 
path-specific inserted checks are executed at appropriate 
points in the execution depending on the runtime control 
path.
The checks recompute the value of the critical variable for 
the runtime control path. The recomputed value is compared 
with the original value computed by the main program. In 
case of a mismatch, the original program is stopped and 
recovery is initiated. Otherwise, execution continues 
normally.
3.4 Example of Derived Detectors
The derived detectors are illustrated using a simplified 
example of an if-then-else statement in Figure 1. A more 
realistic example is presented in Section 4. In the figure, the 
original code is shown in the left and the checking code 
added is shown in the right. Assume that the detector 
placement analysis procedure has identified /  as one of the 
critical variables that need to be checked before its use in the 
following basic block. For simplicity, only the instructions 
in the backward slice of variable/are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Example code fragment with detectors inserted
There are two paths in the program slice of f  corresponding 
to each of the two branches. The instructions on each path 
can be optimized to yield a concise expression that checks 
the value o f/  along that path (shown in yellow in Figure 1). 
In the case of the first path (path=l), the expression reduces 
to (2 * c - e) and this is assigned to the temporary variable 
f2. Similarly the expression for the second path (path =2) 
corresponding to the else branch statement reduces to (a + e) 
and is also assigned to f2. Instrumentation is added to keep 
track of paths at runtime.
At runtime, when control reaches the use of the variable f  
the correct checking expression for / i s  chosen based on the 
value of the path variable and the value of f2  is compared 
with the value o f/com pu ted  by the original program. In 
case there is a mismatch, an error is declared and the 
program is stopped.
3.5 Hardware/Software Implementation
In the proposed technique, the analysis of the program, 
derivation of the checking expression and the addition of 
instrumentation is entirely done at compile-time. At runtime, 
the added instrumentation keeps track of the path followed 
and executes the checking expression corresponding to the 
path. While the runtime checking can be performed in 
hardware or software, we provide a combined hardware- 
software implementation in this paper.
There are two sources of runtime overhead for the detector: 
(1) the overhead of keeping track of the control path 
followed and (2) the overhead of executing the check.
Path Tracking: The overhead of tracking paths is 
significant (4x) when done in software". Therefore, a 
prototype implementation of path tracking is presented in 
hardware. This hardware is integrated with the Reliability 
and Security Engine (RSE) [7], RSE is a hardware 
framework that provides a plug-and-play environment for 
including modules that can perform a variety of checking 
and monitoring tasks in the processor’s data-path level. The 
path-tracking hardware is implemented as a module in the 
RSE framework3 and is configured at application load-time. 
The monitoring is done in parallel with the main program, 
thereby reducing the performance overhead of the 
monitoring.
2 As measured from an experimental evaluation of our earlier 
implementation of this technique in software alone
3 Generically, it can be implemented on any FPGA.
In this paper, the behavior of the path-tracking module is 
simulated in software and the conceptual design of the 
hardware module is presented in Section 4.4.
Checking: In order to further reduce the performance 
overhead, the check execution itself can be moved to 
hardware. This would involve compiling the checking 
expressions directly to hardware and implementing them in 
the RSE. In our current implementation, the checking is 
done in software.
3.6 Discussion
As illustrated in the example in Figure 1, a checking 
expression consists of only those instructions that are part of 
the computation of the critical variable and is specific to 
each control path that reaches the variable from the top of 
the function. Since, the specific set of instructions is 
optimized separately from the rest of the program, the check 
introduces a level of diversity in the recomputation of the 
critical variable. This diversity is valuable in that it provides 
the detection of errors in the program instructions that are 
interleaved with the critical variable’s computation.
Assume that an error in the interleaved instructions affects 
one of the instructions involved in the computation of the 
critical variable (i.e. instructions in the slice). The 
representation of this instruction in the checking expression 
will likely be different from the representation in the original 
program. For example, an add instruction in the original 
program may be optimized to a simple mov instruction in the 
checking expression (assuming that one of the operands of 
the add instruction was zero for the path considered). 
Therefore, the probability of the error impacting the value 
produced by the instruction in both the original program and 
in the checking expression is small. Hence, common mode 
errors between the checking expression and the original 
program can be reduced.
3.7 Errors Detected
The fault model in this study covers errors in data values 
due to both hardware and software faults:
Hardware fault: Any transient error in the following 
hardware components:
• Processor data path'. Includes errors in functional units 
or in the register file that result in data-value corruption.
• Processor control path: Includes errors in the
instruction decode and issue units that result in the 
wrong instruction being executed.
• Memory/Cache'. Errors in the memory or cache caused 
due to cosmic radiation or electric disturbances. These 
errors will also be detected by techniques such as ECC , 
if these techniques are deployed in memory and cache.
The checking expressions derived by the proposed technique 
can detect the above three categories of hardware errors 
provided they affect the computation of the critical variables 
in either the program or the check, but not in both the 
program and the check.
Software fault: Any program defect that causes transient 
data-value corruptions such as:
• Synchronization errors or race conditions that result in 
corruptions of data values due to incorrect sequencing 
of operations.
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• Memory corruption errors, e.g., buffer-overflows and 
dangling pointer references that cause arbitrary’ data 
values to be overwritten in memory, use of un­
initialized or incorrectly initialized values. These errors 
could result in the use of unpredictable outcomes 
depending on the platform and the environment.
The checking expressions derived can detect the above 
software errors, provided the error occurs in the code 
interleaved with the computation of the critical variable, 
and, the error affects one of the values involved in the 
computation of the critical variable in the original program. 
The assumption is that the software error does not occur 
during the recomputation of the critical variable in the 
checking expression^, due to the diversity introduced in the 
checking expression (see Section 3.6).
3.8 Errors not detected
Examples of errors that would not be detected are as 
follows:
• Hardware Errors: Permanent or persistent errors in 
some hardware components would not be detected. For 
example, errors that persist in the functional units of the 
processor would not be detected if both the original 
program statement and the checking expression were 
computed by the same functional unit. However, the 
probability of this occurring is small as modem 
microprocessors have excess capacity of functional 
units.
• Softw are Errors: A common program input that results 
in the program computing the wrong result, although the 
result is valid according to the code semantics. Similarly 
errors that arise due to the code not being faithful to the 
program semantics would not be detected. This is 
because the detectors are derived from the code and not 
from the specifications.
4. Detector Derivation Technique
This section illustrates the detector derivation methodology' 
using a real example of a bubble-sort program shown in 
Figure 2a. The actual analysis and transformations are 
carried out on the compiler's intermediate representation of 
the C code, which is similar to assembly code.
We use the LLVM compiler [23] for the analysis and 
derivation of error detectors. The derivation of detectors is 
done by the introduction of a new pass into LLVM. This 
allows the use of LLVM features while preserving the 
benefits of the new analysis introduced. A simplified version 
of the LLVM intermediate code corresponding to the inner- 
loop in the bubble-sort program is shown in Figure 2b. 
LLVM and SSA Form: LLVM is an optimizing compiler 
infrastructure that uses Static Single Assignment form (SSA) 
[24] as its intermediate code representation. In deriving the 
backward program slice, two well understood properties of 
SSA form are used as follows:
In SSA form, each variable (value) is defined exactly once in 
the program, and the definition is assigned a unique name 
[24]. This unique name makes it easy to identify data 
dependences among instructions.
4 This is a reasonable assumption as software errors in programs disappear 
upon recomputation [33]
SSA form uses a special static construct called the phi 
instruction that is used to keep track of the data dependences 
when there is a merging of data values from different control 
edges. The phi instruction includes the variable name for 
each control edge that is merged and the corresponding basic 
block. This instruction allows the detector derivation 
technique to specialize the backward slice based on control- 
paths. ______________________________________
a)
vo id  B u bble] m t srtElem ents. in t*  sortList) { 
in t i, j ,  top;
b ln ita rr(  sortList, srtE lem ents ); 
top= srtelem ents;
while (  to p > l )  {//O uter-w hile-loop
E l :
while (  i< top  ) { // In n er w hile-loop  
i f  (  -sortiistf i ]  >  so r tlis t[ i+ l ] )
{
j  =  sortii stfi];  
so r tlis tfi]  =  sortii s tfi  4 /  ];  
sortii s t [ i - \ l ]  --- j;
} / /  e n d - i f  
' E H - ! :  ‘
}  //en d -in n e r-w h ile  
to p - to p -1 ;
} / / ' end-ou ter-w hile
/
loopentry:
brboo ltm p.6 , labelno_exit, labelbcp_exl
j no exit:
Indvar.i = p h i[0 , loopentry ], / imp i then] ¡Imp.] end'if]
tm p .i= add indvar.i, 1
i.1 = cast tm p.¡to Int
tmp.9.i = getArrayEtement sortirsi tmp.i
tm p.10 = load [tm p .9 ]
tm p.12 = add 1.1, 1
tmp. 13 = getArrayElement sortis , tmp .12
tmp. 14 = load ¡tmp. 13] 
tmp.15 = setgttmp.10, tmp.14 
I b r tmp. 15, label then, label en d l
H
store tmp.14, ¡tmp.9 ] 
store tmp. 10, [tmp. 13] 
b re n d i
tmp.16 -  se tt tmp.12, top 
brtm p.16, no_exl loopjaxk
____________________ ^  loopexit:
Figure 2: (a) Example code fragment (bubble-sort) and 
(b) and the corresponding LLVM intermediate code for 
the inner w hile loop in (a)
Value Recomputation Pass: In order to derive checking 
expressions, a new' compiler pass called the Value 
Re computation Pass was introduced into the LLVM 
compiler. The input to the new pass is the LLVM 
intermediate code of the original program, and its output is 
LLVM intermediate code with the checks inserted.
The Value Recomputation pass performs the backward 
slicing starting from the instruction that computes the value 
of the critical variable to the beginning of the function. It 
also performs check derivation, insertion and 
instrumentation.
5
The output of the pass is provided as input to other 
optimization passes in LLVM, which in turn are used to 
derive the checking expression. By extracting the path- 
specific backward slice and exposing them to other 
optimization passes in the compiler, the Value 
Recomputation pass enables aggressive compiler 
optimizations to be performed on the slice than otherwise 
possible.
An important contribution of this paper is the algorithm used 
for creating the path-specific slice for critical variables. The 
notion of a path-specific slice has been used in model 
checking of C programs for errors, to improve accuracy in 
locating the error-causing statements in the program [25], 
While the algorithm presented in [25] greatly reduces the 
number of paths considered for error checking, it is still 
prone to the spurious path problem. Further, the algorithm 
cannot be extended to deriving runtime error detectors in a 
straightforward manner.
To the best o f our knowledge, this paper presents the first 
path-specific static slicing algorithm for deriving runtime 
eiror detectors.
4.1 Identification of critical variables
The identification of critical variables is performed based on 
the technique proposed in [10], The technique considers 
potential error propagation in the program based on its 
Dynamic Dependence Graph (DDG). Critical variables are 
chosen based on heuristics computed from the DDG. Critical 
variables are defined as those variables having the highest 
fanouts (number of dynamic uses) in a function. Placing 
detectors at critical variables provides the maximum error 
detection coverage for errors that result in program crashes 
and fail-silent violations [10].
Computation of Fanouts: The compiler first instruments 
the program and the instrumented program is executed (on 
representative inputs) to gather profile data. The profile data 
is then given as input to the Value Recomputation which 
computes the fanout of a variable as the sum of the 
execution frequencies of the basic blocks containing static 
uses of the variable. The pass then chooses the top N  
variables with the highest fanouts in each function as critical 
variables (for that function).
Assume that the critical variable chosen for the example in 
Figure 2a is sortlist[i]. The intermediate code representation 
of this variable is the instruction tmp.10 in Figure 2b.
4.2 Computation of backward slice of critical 
variable
This section presents the algorithm to compute the backward 
slice of a critical variable for each control path from the 
beginning of the function to the program location that 
performs the computation of the critical variable.
Overview o f  Algorithm. The instruction that computes the 
critical variable is called the critical instruction. In order to 
derive the backward program slice, a backward traversal of 
the Static Dependence Graph (SDG) is performed starting 
from the critical instruction. The traversal continues until 
one of the following conditions is met, (1) The beginning of 
the current function is reached (only intra-procedural slices 
are considered) or (2) A basic block that had been previously 
encountered in the backward traversal is revisited (loops are
not recomputed) or (3) The critical instruction occurs in- 
between the producer instruction of the dependence and the 
consumer instruction of the dependence (only previous loop 
iterations are considered when traversing loop-carried 
dependences).
The rationale for each o f  these cases is presented below:
• Intra-procedural Slices: As already mentioned, it is
sufficient to consider intra-procedural slices in the 
backward traversal because each function is considered 
separately for the detector placement analysis. For 
example in Figure 2a, the array sortList is passed in as 
an argument to the function from the main function. The 
slice does not include the computation of sortList in 
main. If sortList is a critical variable in the main 
function, then a check will be placed for the variable in 
the main function.
• No recomputation o f loops: During the backward 
traversal, if a dependence within a loop is encountered, 
the loop is not recomputed in the checking expression. 
Instead, the check is broken into two checks, one placed 
on the critical variable and one on the variable that 
affects the critical variable within the loop. This second 
check ensures that the variable within the loop is 
computed correctly and hence the variable can be used 
directly in the check.
• Only the previous loop iteration is considered in 
traversing loop cairied dependences: When a loop- 
carried-dependence across two or more iterations is 
encountered, the dependence is truncated and the loop 
dependence is not included in the slice. This is because 
duplicating across multiple loop iterations can involve 
loop unrolling or buffering intermediate values that are 
rewritten in the loop. Instead, the check is broken into 
two checks, one for the dependence-generating variable 
across multiple iterations and one for the critical 
variable.
Algorithm Description. The pseudo-code of the algorithm is 
shown in Figure 4. The algorithm maintains the list of 
instructions in the slice specialized for each path in the array 
SliceList. The function computeSlice takes as input the 
critical instruction and outputs the SliceList array, which 
contains for each acyclic path in the control-flow graph, the 
instructions in the slice corresponding to that path (in 
execution order). When the ComputeSlice function 
terminates, the following properties hold true: (1) The 
backward slice of the critical instruction along each acyclic 
control path in the function has been computed and (2) 
Checks have been added for variables that affect the critical 
instruction but could not be included in the slice of the 
critical instruction (for the reasons considered above).
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Function visit( seedlnstruction, pathID, parent ):
ActiveSet ={ seedlnstruction } 
if parent==0:
SliceList[ pathID ] = { }
else:
SliceList[ pathID ] = SliceList[ parent ] 
nextPathID = pathID 
while not empty( ActiveSet ):
I = Remove instruction for ActiveSet 
Visited[ BasicBlock(I) ] = true 
// Do not consider interprocedural slices 
/ / l i s a  function argument or constant: 
terminal = true
else if I is a non-phi instruction:
SliceList[ pathID] = SliceList[PathID] 
U { I }
ActiveSet = ActiveSet U operands! I ) 
else if  I is a phi instruction:
fo r each operand of the phi:
// Check if a loop is encountered 
// or if going back multiple iterations 
i f  not ( Visited [ BasicBlock(operand) ] 
and not CrossingInsn(I, operand)) 
nextPathID = pathID + 1 
result = call Visit( operand,
nextPathID, pathID ) 
terminal = terminal OR -(result) 
else:
SeedList = SeedListU { operand }
// Add the path to the pathList if terminal path
i f  (terminal)
PathList = PathList U { pathID } 
return terminal
Function computeSlices (criticallnstruction):
SeedList = { criticallnstruction }
PathList = { }
while not empty( SeedList):
seedInstruction=Remove instruction from SeedList 
call visit( seedlnstruction. 0, 0 )
______return PathList, SliceList___________________________
Figure 3: Pseudo-code for path-specific program slicing 
starting from critical instruction
The actual traversal of the dependence graph occurs in the 
function visit, which takes as input the starting instruction, 
an ID (number) corresponding to the control-flow path it 
traverses (index of the path in the SliceList array), and the 
index of the parent path.
The visit function visits each operand of an instruction in 
turn, adding them to the SliceList of the current path. When a 
phi instruction is encountered, it spawns a new path for each 
operand of the phi instruction (by calling the visit function 
recursively on the operand) with a new path ID and the 
current path as the parent. The traversal is then continued 
along this new path.
Only terminal paths are added to the final list of paths 
{PathList) returned by the ComputeSlice procedure. A 
terminal path is defined as one that terminates without 
spawning any new paths.
Some instructions cannot be recomputed in the checking 
expression, because performing recomputation of such 
instructions can alter the semantics of the program. 
Examples are mallocs, frees, function calls and function
returns. Omitting mallocs and frees does not seem to impact 
coverage except for allocation intensive programs, as shown 
by our results in Section 6.2. Omitting function calls and 
returns does not impact coverage for program functions 
because the detector placement analysis considers each 
function separately for identifying critical variables.
The algorithm also takes into account certain features of 
SSA form to optimize its performance (not shown in Figure 
3). For example, SSA form ensures that each definition of a 
variable dominates its use [35] and the algorithm uses this to 
avoid re-traversing some paths. Further, the algorithm 
performs routine optimizations such as memoization for 
efficiency.
Output of algorithm. The backward slice of tmp.10 consists 
of two paths shown in Figure 4. The first path in Figure 4 
(path 0) corresponds to the control-flow transfer from the 
basic block no exit to the basic block loopentry, whereas the 
second path (path 1) corresponds to the control-flow transfer 
from the basic block endif to the basic block loopentry. Li. 
Memory Dependences. While LLVM does not represent 
memory objects in SSA form, it promotes most memory 
objects to registers prior to running a pass (including the 
Value Recomputation pass). Since there is an unbounded 
number of virtual registers for storing variables in SSA 
form, the compiler does not have to be constrained by the 
actual number of physical registers available for the 
machine.
Path 0: no ex itlo o p e n try ' Path 1: end if loopentry
indvar.i = phi indvar.i=phi [0, loopentry>],
[0. loopentry], [tmp. i, then], [tmp. i, then],[tmp. i. endif]
[tmp.i, endif] tmp..i = add indvar.i, 1
tmp.i = add indvar.i, 1 tmp.9=getArrayIndex sortlist,tmp.i
tmp. 9=getArrayIndex 
sortii st, tmp.i 
tmp.10 = load[ tmp. 9 ]
tmp. 10.i = load [ tmp. 9 ]
Figure 4: Path-specific slices extracted for the example
There are cases however, when it may not be possible to 
promote a memory objects to a register e.g. pointer 
references to dynamically allocated data. In such cases, the 
Value Recomputation pass duplicates the load of the 
memory object, provided the load address is not modified 
along the path considered from the load instruction to the 
critical instruction. While duplicating loads may seem to 
introduce a performance bottleneck in the program, it would 
not matter much in practice as the compiler may assign the 
loaded value to a register (and remove both the original and 
duplicate loads). Even if the load operand is from a memory 
operand, it is likely to hit in the cache due to the fact that is 
the value was loaded in by the original program before the 
check is executed.
It is also possible to duplicate the store instruction that 
caused the memory dependence. However, duplicating loads 
seems to be sufficient to obtain high coverage even for 
pointer-intensive applications involving dynamic data- 
structures (as seen in Section 5.3).
4.3 Check Derivation, Check Insertion and 
Instrumentation
Check Derivation: The Value Recomputation pass places 
the instructions in the backward slice of the critical variable
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corresponding to each control path in a separate basic block. 
The pass also replaces the phi instructions in the slice with 
the incoming value corresponding to the control edges along 
each path. This allows the compiler to substitute the 
incoming value directly in the recomputation of instructions 
that originally used the phi-value. Further, since there are no 
control-transfers within the sequence of instructions 
included in each path, the compiler is able to optimize the 
instruction sequence for the path much more aggressively 
than it would have optimized otherw ise. This is because the 
compiler in and of itself, would not consider specific control 
paths (in the slice) wdien performing optimizations.
Check Insertion. After the check is derived, the Value 
Recomputation pass does the following:
1. Inserts the check consisting of the reduced expressions 
from the slice immediately after the computation of the 
critical instruction (in Figure 5, it places the check after 
the imp. 10).
2. Creates copies of variables used in the checking 
expression that are not live at the check insertion point. 
For example in Figure 5, a copy of imp A is created, as 
the value of tmp.i is overwritten in the loop before the 
check can be reached. The copy is used in the check.
3. Renames the values of the variables in the check to 
avoid conflicts with the original program.
4. Inserts a branch instruction to execute the correct 
checking expression based on pathVal. which stores the 
control-path retrieved from the hardware path-tracking 
module (Section 4.4 ).
The LLVM intermediate code from Figure 2b with the 
checks inserted by the Value Recomputation pass is shown 
in Figure 5.
Figure 5: LLVM Intermediate code with inserted checks
Instrumentation: The pass instruments selected control- 
flow edges that uniquely identify the paths extracted by the 
backward slicing algorithm. This instrumentation interfaces 
with the hardware module to track paths at runtime (see 
Section 4.4).
4.4 Discussion
As illustrated in the example in Figure 5, the instructions in 
the checking expression are optimized separately from the 
rest of the program. As a result, the check introduces a level 
o f diversity in the re computation o f the critical variable. 
This diversity provides detection of errors in the instructions 
involved in the critical variable’s computation.
Consider what happens when an error affects an instruction 
that is involved in the computation of the critical variable. 
Assume that the error affects the instruction that computes 
tmp.i in Figure 2b (this instruction indirectly impacts the 
computation of the critical variable tmp.10).
We now describe how this error is detected by the checking 
expressions in pathO and pathl, when the corresponding 
control paths are executed by the program.
First consider the case when the runtime path followed 
corresponds to the execution of the checking expression in 
the basic block pathO (Figure 5). In pathO, the compiler 
performs constant propagation and replaces the computation 
of tmp.i w ith the constant 1 in Figure 5. As a result, the error 
in the computation of tmp.i is not manifested in pathO. 
Hence, the value of the critical variable computed in pathO, 
namely new.0.tmp.10, is different from the value of the 
critical variable computed in the original program (Figure 5). 
Therefore the error in the computation of tmp.i is detected 
along pathO.
Now7 consider the case when the path followed 
corresponds to the execution of the checking expression in 
pathl (Figure 5). The Value Recomputation Pass inserts 
code to copy the original value of tmp. i into old. tmp. i before 
tmp.i is overwritten in the program. The value old.tmp.i is 
used in the checking expression in pathl to recompute the 
value of tmp.i, namely new.1.tmp.i, which in turn is used to 
recompute the critical variable in pathl. The value new.tmp.i 
is computed and stored separately from the original value 
tmp.i, and consequently does not suffer from the error that 
affected the computation of tmp.i. As a result, the value of 
the critical variable computed in pathl, namely new. 1.tmp.i 
is different from the one computed in the original program 
{Figure 5). Therefore the error in the computation of tmp.i is 
detected along pathl.
In the first case, the checking expression performed a 
recomputation of the critical variable with diversity in 
instructions (pathO) while in the second case it performed 
the recomputation with diversity in data (pathl). In both 
cases, the diversity was introduced by the transformations 
carried out by the Value Recomputation Pass and subsequent 
optimization passes. Therefore, the diversity> introduced by 
the checking expressions allows the detection o f errors that 
may’ not have been detected due to simple duplication alone.
4.5 Implementation of Path-tracking in 
Hardware
The path-tracking hardware keeps track of the control paths 
encoded as finite state machines. The Value Recomputation 
pass synthesizes the state machines for each check 
automatically from the program. The algorithm to convert 
the control-flow paths corresponding to each check into state 
machines is straightforward and is not described here.
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As explained in Section 3.5, the path-tracking hardware is 
implemented as a module in the RSE and monitors the main 
processor data path. The state machines corresponding to 
each check in the application are programmed into the path­
tracking module at application load time. Since the number 
of checks is small (10-50), the memory required to store the 
state machine in hardware is small (Section 5.4).
Other approaches: Many approaches have been proposed 
for profiling application control paths using specialized 
hardware [31]. The goal of these approaches is to create 
statistical aggregates of application behavior, rather than 
track specific paths. Zhang et al. [30] propose a hardware 
module that interfaces with the processor pipeline to track 
paths for detecting security attacks. However, their approach 
requires every branch in the program to be instrumented, 
which can lead to prohibitive overheads. Our approach is 
aimed at tracking specific control-paths in the program (for 
which checks are derived), and requires only selected control 
edges (branches) to be instrumented.
Interface with main processor: The main processor uses 
special instructions called CHECK instructions to invoke the 
RSE modules. The path tracking module supports three 
primitive operations encoded as CHECK instructions. The 
operations are as follows:
emitEdge (from, to): Triggers transitions in the state
machines corresponding to one or more checks. Each basic 
block in the program is assigned a unique identifier assigned 
by the Value Recomputation pass. This operation indicates 
that control is transferred from the basic block with identifier 
from to the basic block with identifier to. 
getState(checklD): Returns the current state of the state 
machine corresponding to the check, and is invoked just 
before the execution of the check in the program. 
resetState(checklD): Resets the state-machine for the check 
given by checkID. This operation is invoked after the 
execution of the check in the program.
Module Components: The path-tracking module is shown 
in Figure 6. It consists of three main components as follows: 
Edge Table: Stores the mapping from control-flow edges to 
edge-identifiers for instrumented edges in the program. Each 
instrumented control-flow edge is assigned a unique index 
and is mapped to the identifiers assigned to the source and 
sink basic blocks for that edge.
State Vector: Holds the current state of the state machine 
corresponding to the checks, with one entry for each check 
inserted in the program.
State Transition Table: Contains the transitions
corresponding to the state machines. The rows of the state 
transition table correspond to the edge indices, while the 
columns correspond to the checks. The cells of the table 
contain the transitions that are fired for each check when a 
control-flow edge is taken in the program.
RSE Interface: Converts the CHECK instructions from the 
main processor into signals specific to the path-tracking 
moduleT Similarly, converts signals from the path-tracking 
module into special flags in the main processor. This is a 
common component shared by all modules of the RSE
Figure 6: Hardware module for tracking paths
Module Operation: The operation of the path-tracking 
module for each of the primitive operations (executed in the 
main processor) is considered below:
CHECK instruction with emitEdge operation is executed in 
the main processor:
• RSE interface asserts the emitEdge signal and sends the 
basic block identifiers that constitute the edge in the 
f i ’om and to lines.
• The from and to identifiers are looked up in the edge 
table and the edge index corresponding to the edge is 
sent to the state transition table.
• The row corresponding to the edge is looked up in the 
state transition table.
• For each non-empty table-entry in the column 
corresponding to the checks, the states in the LHS of the 
transitions stored in the table entry are compared to the 
current state of the check in the state vector.
• If the states match, then the transition is fired and the 
state vector entry corresponding to the check is updated 
with the state in the RHS of the transition that matched.
CHECK instruction with the getState operation is executed 
in the main processor:
• RSE interface asserts the getState signal and sends the 
identifier of the check on the checkID line to the path­
tracking module.
• The path tracking module looks up the state in the state 
vector and sends it to the RSE interface through the 
cuirentState line. This in turn is sent to the main 
processor and is returned as the value of the CHECK 
instruction (through a special register in the RSE).
CHECK instruction with resetState operation is executed in 
the main processor: This is similar to the getState operation, 
but no value is returned to the RSE interface.
Function calIs/returns: The state vector needs to be 
preserved across function calls and returns. This is done by 
pushing the state vector on a separate stack (different from 
the function call stack) along with the return address upon a 
function call and by popping the stack upon a return. The 
Value Recomputation pass generates code that uses special 
CHECK instructions to manipulate the stack on function 
calls/retums. The details are omitted due to space 
constraints.
This is done by tapping the Fetch out signal from the main pipeline.
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5. Experimental Setup
This section describes the mechanisms for measurement of 
performance and coverage provided by the proposed 
technique. It also describes the benchmarks used for 
evaluation.
5.1 Performance Measurements
All experiments are carried out on a single processor P4 
machine with 1GB RAM and 2.0 Ghz clock speed running 
on the Linux operating system. The performance overheads 
of each individual component introduced by the proposed 
technique can be measured as follows:
• Modification overhead: Performance overhead due 
to the extra code introduced by the Value 
Recomputation pass.
• Checking overhead: Performance overhead of 
executing the instructions in each check to 
recompute the critical variable.
The performance overhead of the hardware module is likely 
to be very' small6 because the path tracking can be done in 
parallel with the execution of the main program. The path­
tracking module needs to be synchronized with the main 
processor only at the getState operation, and can execute 
asynchronously the rest of the time. This allows the path­
tracking module itself to be organized as a sequence of 
pipeline stages for efficiency. Hence, the overhead o f  path­
tracking is not considered in measuring performance 
overheads (as path tracking is done in hardware).
5.2 Coverage Measurements
Fault Injections: Faults are injected into the application 
code to measure the coverage of the technique. The fault- 
injection methodology inserts calls to a special faultlnject 
function (at compile-time) after the computation of each 
program variable in the original program, with the value of 
the variable passed as an argument to the faultlnject 
function. The uses of the program variable in the original 
program are substituted with the return value of the 
faultlnject function.
At runtime, the call to the faultlnject function corrupts the 
value of a single program variable by flipping a single bit in 
its value. The value into which the fault is injected is chosen 
at random from the entire set of dynamic values used in an 
error-free execution of the program. In order to ensure 
controllability, only a single fault is injected in each 
execution of the application.
Error Detection: After a fault is injected, the following 
program outcomes are possible: (1) the program may 
terminate by taking an exception (crash), (2) the program 
may continue and produce correct output (success), (3) the 
program may continue and produce incorrect output (fail- 
silent violation) or (4) the program may timeout (hang).
The injected fault may also cause one of the inserted 
detectors to detect the error and flag a violation. When a 
violation is flagged, the program is allowed to continue 
(although in reality it would be stopped) so that the final 
outcome of the program can be observed. The coverage of
6 While we have not quantified the performance overhead in this paper, our 
earlier experience with building error detectors in hardware [11] indicates 
that the performance overhead is less than 5%.
the detector is classified based on the observed outcome. For 
example, a detector is said to detect a crash if the detector 
upon encountering the error, flags a violation, after which 
the program crashes. Hence, when a detector detects a crash, 
it is in reality, preempting the crash.
Error Propagation: Our goal is to measure the
effectiveness of the detectors in detecting errors that 
propagate before causing the program to crash. For errors 
that do not propagate before the crash, the crash itself may 
be considered the detection mechanism. Hence, coverage 
provided by the derived detectors for such errors is not 
reported.
In the experiments, error propagation is tracked by observing 
whether an instruction that uses the erroneous variable’s 
value (according to the static data dependence graph of the 
program) is executed after the fault has been injected. If the 
original value into which the error was injected is 
overwritten, the error propagation is no longer tracked.
5.3 Benchmarks
Table 1: Characteristics of Benchmark programs
Bench
mark
Lines of 
C code
Description of program
IntMM 159 Matrix multiplication of integers
RealMM 161 Matrix multiplication of floating-points
FFT 270 Computes Fast-Fourier Transform
Quicksort 174 Sorts a list of numbers using quicksort
Bubblesort 171 Sorts a list of numbers using bubblesort
Treesort 187 Sorts a list of numbers using treesort
Perm 169 Computes all permutations of a string
Queens 188 Solves the N-Queens problem
Towers 218 Solves the Towers of Hanoi problem
Health 409 Discrete-event simulation using double linked 
lists
Em3d 639 Electro-magnetic wave propagation in 3D (using 
single linked lists)
Mst 389 Computes minimum spanning tree (graphs)
Bames-
Hut
1427 Solves N-body force computation problem using 
octrees
Tsp 572 Solves traveling salesman problem using binary 
trees
In order to evaluate the system, 9 programs from the 
Stanford benchmark suite and 5 programs from the Olden 
benchmark suite [28] are used. The former benchmark set 
consists of small programs performing a multitude of 
common tasks. The latter benchmark set consists of pointer­
intensive programs commonly used to test memory system 
performance. Table 1 shows a description of the program 
characteristics. The first nine programs belong to the 
Stanford suite and the remaining five to the Olden suite.
5.4 Hardware Area overhead
The area overheads for the hardware module are dominated 
by the three main components of the module presented in 
Section 4.4. The other components are mainly glue 
combinational logic and occupy negligible area.
Table 2 presents the formulas used in estimating the size of 
the dominant hardware components.The size of each of these 
components depends on (1) the number of control-flow 
edges corresponding to state transitions (m), (2) the number 
of checks that must be tracked for the application (n) and, 
(3) the maximum number of transitions in each entry of the
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state transition table because the table must be big enough to 
hold the biggest entry (k).
Table 2: Formulas for calculation of hardware area 
overheads
Hardware Size Explanation
Component (bits)
Edge Table m * Each entry has 3 fields from, to and edgelndex.
16 *
3
Each of these fields consists of 16 bits.
State Vector n * 8 Each entry of the state vector consists of 8 bits, 
which is the number of bits used to encode states
Transition n * m Each state transition consists of two 8-bit fields
Table * k * to encode the starting and ending states of the
16 transition.
6. Results
This section presents the performance (Section 6.1), and 
coverage results (Section 6.2) obtained from the 
experimental evaluation of the proposed technique. The 
results are reported for the case when 5 critical variables 
were chosen in each function by the detector placement 
analysis. The results for the hardware area overheads are 
presented in Section 6.3.
6.1 Performance Results
The performance results are shown in Figure 7 when 5 
critical variables are chosen per function. The main results 
are summarized below
The average checking overhead introduced by the detectors 
is 25%, while the average code modification overhead is 8%. 
The total performance overhead is therefore 33%.
The worst-case overheads incurred are in the case of tsp, 
which has a total overhead of nearly 80%. This is because 
tsp is a compute-intensive program involving tight loops. 
Placing checks within a loop introduces extra branches, and 
therefore increases its overhead. This can be avoided by 
implementing the check entirely in hardware, thereby 
causing minimum perturbation of the program’s behavior. 
This is a direction for future work.
6.2 Coverage Results
The coverage results (reported in percentages) when 5 
critical variables are chosen in each function are reported in 
Table 3. For each application, 1000 faults are injected, one 
in each execution of the application. A blank entry in the 
table indicates that no faults of the type were manifested for 
the application. For example, no hangs were manifested for 
the IntMM application in the 1000 fault injection runs.
Only program crashes that exhibit error propagation (before 
the crash) are considered. The numbers within the braces in 
this column indicate the percentage of propagated, crash- 
causing errors that are detected before propagation.
The results in Table 3 are summarized as follows:
• The derived detectors detect 77% of errors that 
propagate and crash the program
• 64% of crash-causing errors that propagate are detected 
before first propagation. These correspond to 83% of 
the propagated crash-causing errors that are detected.
• The number of benign errors detected is 2.5% on 
average. These errors have no effect on the execution of 
the application.
• The coverage for fail-silent violations is 41% (on 
average), and the coverage for hangs is 35%
Table 3: Coverage results for 5 critical variables per 
function
Apps Propagated Crashes (%)
FSV
(%)
Hang
(%)
Success
(%)
IntMM 100 (97) 100 9
RealMM 100 (98) 0
FFT 57 (34) 7 60 0.5
Quicksort 90 (57) 44 100 4
Bubblesort 100 (73) 100 0 5
Treesort 75 (68) 50 3
Perm 100 (55) 16 0.9
Queens 79 (61) 20 3
Towers 79 (78) 39 100 2
Health 39 (39) 0 0 0
Em3d 79 (79) 1
Mst 83 (53) 79 0 5
Barnes-Hut 49 (39) 23
Tsp 64 (64) 0 0
Average 77 (64) 41 35 2.5
The worst-case coverage for crashes (that exhibit error 
propagation) is obtained in the case of the Olden program 
health (39%). The health program is allocation-intensive, 
and spends a substantial fraction (over 50%) of its time in 
malloc calls. Our technique does not protect the return value 
of mallocs as duplicating malloc calls may change the 
semantics of the program. Further, the technique does not 
place detectors within the body of the malloc function, as it 
does not have access to the source-code of library functions. 
This is not an inherent limitation of our technique, and can 
be easily overcome by placing detectors inside libraiy 
functions (by the library developer, for instance).
6.3 Hardware Overheads
The results estimating the hardware size overhead across 
applications are presented in Table 4. The average number 
of bits stored by the hardware module is 4928. This 
corresponds to less then 1 KB of storage space in the 
hardware. The application exhibiting the worst-case 
overhead (Bames-hut) occupies 33452 bits, corresponding to 
less than 4KB of memory. This fits into a standard FPGA 
BRAM cell which has about 5096KB of memory 
available[34],
6.4 Discussion
The results indicate that our technique can achieve 75-80% 
coverage for errors that propagate and cause the program to 
crash. Full-duplication approaches can provide 100% 
coverage if they perform comparisons after each instruction. 
In practice, this is very expensive and full-duplication 
approaches compare instructions before store and branch 
instructions [14] [15], In this optimized mode of execution, 
the coverage provided by full-duplication is less than 100%. 
The papers that describe these techniques do not quantify the 
detection coverage in terms of error propagation, so a direct 
comparison with by our technique is not possible.
Further, the performance overhead of the technique is only 
33 %, compared to full-duplication, which incurs an 
overhead of 60-100% when performed in software [14] [15], 
An important aspect of the technique is that it detects just 
2.5 % of benign errors in an application.
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Figure 7: Performance overhead when 5 critical variables are chosen in each function 
Table 4: Hardw are Size overheads across applications
Application
Name
Number of 
edges (m)
Number of 
checks(n)
Maximum 
transitions 
/entry (k)
Edge Table 
Size (bits)
Transition 
table size 
(bits)
State 
Vector 
Size (bits)
Total 
Size (bits)
IntMM 10 21 3 480 630 168 1278
RealMM 10 21 3 480 630 168 1278
e f t 17 30 4 816 2040 240 3096
Quicksort 19 29 5 912 2755 232 3899
Bubblesort 5 11 1 240 55 88 383
Treesort 10 20 4 480 800 160 1440
Perm 16 27 1 768 432 216 1416
Queens 5 20 1 240 100 160 500
Towers 11 31 1 528 341 248 1117
Health 9 52 1 432 468 416 1316
Em3d 8 30 3 384 720 240 1344
Mst 17 33 10 816 5610 264 6690
Perimeter 26 57 9 1248 13338 456 15042
Barnes-Hut 43 118 6 2064 30444 944 33452
Tsp 9 48 2 432 864 384 1680
Average 14 37 4 432 688 3949 4928
7. Conclusions and Future W ork
This paper presented a technique to error detectors 
for protecting an application from data errors (both 
due to hardware and software). The error detectors 
were derived automatically using compiler-based 
static analysis from the backward program slice of 
critical variables in the program. The slice is 
optimized aggressively and differently (from the rest 
of the code) based on specific control-paths in the 
application, to form a checking expression. At 
runtime, the checking expression corresponding to 
the executed control path is tracked using specialized 
hardware and the checking expressions 
corresponding to the control-path are executed. The 
checking expression recomputes the value of the 
critical variable and a mismatch between the 
recomputed and original values indicates an error. 
Experiments show' that the derived detectors achieve 
low-overhead error detection (33%) while providing 
high coverage (77%) for errors that matter to the 
application (propagate and result in a crash).
Future work will involve implementing the checking 
expressions derived in hardware (as part of the RSE 
[7]) and joint synthesis of the path-tracking module.
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